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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
THE LEGALITY OF NUREMBERG
Twenty years have now passed and still the controversy continues as
to whether or not the trials at Nuremberg were in compliance with inter-
national law. Although the trials of the major war criminals are now left
to the historian, they are still of great importance to the formulation of
present international law and are therefore of great interest to the legal
profession. Throughout the history of man war has plagued our society.
At no time prior to the adoption of the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal did the creation of war constitute a crime. The basic
problem faced by Nuremberg was whether or not the Allies could make
the creation of war a crime. In order to answer this question it must first
be ascertained whether or not the Allies had jurisdiction to prescribe a
mandate of this nature and, secondly, whether or not they had jurisdiction
to enforce that mandate.
In 1945, and even at the present time, many international leaders and
scholars adhered to a view which disposes of any possible justification
for Nuremberg because of the lack of any justifiable jurisdiction. This
school of thought refuses to recognize any punitive remedies for the
individual authors of the war under international criminal procedure.'
Because of an insufficient basis for its jurisdiction, these eminent thinkers
believe that the prosecution of those responsible for the war was itself a
violation of international law. This same conclusion was formulated by
the Commission which was appointed by the Preliminary Peace Con-
ference upon termination of the hostilities of World War I. After several
months of investigation, the Commission suggested a formal condemna-
tion of the authors of the war and the blueprinting of some effective
penalties for the future.2 However, for reasons which will be explained
below, they refused to advocate any punitive measures for the individual
authors of the First World War. They decided that the investigative
resources of the historian were more suited for establishing the responsi-
bility for the creation of the war than that of the judge.
Another approach to the problem, while not recognizing the availability
of legitimate jurisdiction for judicial action, was to use political action.
Legally this could have been accomplished by a conditional armistice
with Germany.' Although this policy would have necessitated some altera-
tions of the "unconditional surrender" agreement of the Allies, it was
legally feasible. There was international precedent for this approach in
1. Jackson, Nuremberg in Retrospect, 35 A.B.A.J. 813 (1949).
2. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, 14 Am. J. INT'L L. 95 (1920).
3. Glueck, The Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARv. L. R.v. 396, 398 (1946).
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the exile of Napoleon.' While there was no doubt regarding the. legality
of this approach, politically it would have conceded that Germany had a
legal right to refuse to submit those responsible for the war to interna-
tional sanctions. While this complies with international law, it was not in
compliance with the political aims of the Allies.
The great advantage of political rather than judicial action was, as
has been stated previously, that the path of international precedent had
already been cleared for it. As a result, this policy would not have re-
quired an elaborate legal justification.
The Allies are under no moral or legal compulsion to "try" the
Nazi culprits from whom they would exact retribution. The
moral crime of these men, is not a fact that requires to be
established by the judicial process ...
These men are amenable to direct political action. . . . No
simularcrum of a "trial" is required to reach our objective; the
conscience of mankind would be better satisfied by the swift
execution of all these malefactors than by the rhetorical pyro-
technics of Nuremberg.5
One very important drawback to a political or summary action is that
it deprives the Allies of their prime objective in punishing those responsi-
ble for the war. As Justice Jackson has pointed out, the most important
quality of the Tribunal was that it provided the prosecution with the
opportunity of demonstrating to Germany and to the rest of the world
that the defendants were on trial, not because they lost the war, but
because they started it.' The Tribunal was designed to be a lesson in
history, unlike that at Waterloo, which would emphasize the criminality
of war so as to deter future authors of war. Its most notable significance
was to take judicial jurisdiction so that the acts which were perpetrated
would become crimes in the full legal context of the word.
There is perhaps no need to recall in these pages that the
Nuremberg trial represents the first time in history that legal
proceedings have been instituted against leaders of an enemy
nation.. It is perhaps equal supererogation to state here that
there are no exact precedents for the charges made by the
American, British, French and Russian prosecutors that to plot
or wage a war of aggression is a crime for which individuals may
be punished.... [It] was because of these very facts that...
4. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1962).
5. April, An Inquiry into the Judicial Basis for the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, 30
MINN. L. REV. 313, 328, 329 (1946).
6. Statement of Chief US. Counsel upon Signing of Agreement, 19 TEMP. L.Q. 169
(1945).
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the prosecution presented a challenge to itself ... as great as to
the defense.'
While a great burden rested on the Tribunal to justify judicial rather
than political action, the catastrophic phenomena of the war and its
atrocities supplied the signatory powers of the charter and the prosecu-
tion a most opportune moment in the history of man to declare that
aggressive war was a crime for which the individual authors could be
punished.' An ad hoc decision was obligatory in 1945 for such a declara-
tion. Any other means of reprisal would have created the negative prece-
dent in international law. The atrocities of the war demanded a declara-
tion that the principles of international law considered these aggressions
as a crime. So that thereafter no man could deny that the creation of
war was an international crime for which punitive measures could be
exercised against the individual instigator.'
As Justice Jackson has often stated, the greatest legal obstacle for
the Tribunal was the lack of any established precedent for judicial
action."° The Tribunal shouldered a double burden. They had the re-
sponsibility of not only trying the defendants, but also had to justify
within the sphere of international law their right to do so. The Chief
American Prosecutor stated it this way: While "Courts try cases . . .
cases also try courts."" The latter part of the Tribunal's burden was of
more significance to the development of international law than the former.
It presented the Tribunal with the issue of whether or not the community
of nations and its legal system was capable of coping with the problems
of war judicially or did this legal system only permit political reprisal?
If the latter is true, aggressive war is not a crime, no matter how atrocious
its effects may be. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the
charter of Nuremberg and its Tribunal be founded on principles of inter-
national law and not merely on the emotion of vengeance and the ideals
of morality.
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
Jurisdiction
"Jurisdiction" ... means the capacity of a state under inter-
national law to prescribe or to enforce rules of law....
Jurisdiction to "prescribe" refers to the capacity of a state
under international law to make rules of law .... Jurisdiction to
7. 1 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AooPESSlON, V, United States Government Printing Office
(1946).
8. Supra note 1.
9. Justice Jackson's Final Report to the President Concerning the Nurnberg War Crimes
Trial, 20 TEMP'. L.Q. 338 (1947).
10. Ibid.
11. Jackson, The Rule of Law Among Nations, 19 TEmP. L.Q. 135, 140 (1945).
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"enforce" refers to the capacity of a state under international
law to enforce a rule of law .... 12
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal derived its juris-
diction to prescribe from the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928."8 This treaty
established that war was no longer a legal recourse for effectuating
national policy. Prior to the Kellog-Briand Pact, war, for whatever pur-
pose, was a legal right of nations. There were no distinctions between
just or unjust wars, or between aggressive and defensive wars. All war
was legal. The Kellog-Briand Pact condemned war as an instrumentality
of national policy and, as a result, outlawed all war. It did not, however,
declare war to be a crime. The effect of the Kellog-Briand Pact was to
give to the nations of the world the authority or the jurisdiction to
effectuate the dictates of its provisions. The Kellog-Briand Pact was the
excavation into which the foundation of the International Military Tri-
bunal could be poured. Without the Kellog-Briand Pact the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to prescribe.
The second phase in establishing legitimate jurisdiction is to acquire
jurisdiction to "enforce." Prior to 1945 no nation or group of nations was
in a position capable of enforcing the law as it was manifested in the
Charter. At the end of World War II the Allies, as victors, were, for the
first time in the history of mankind, capable of declaring aggressive
war to be a crime and at the same time able to take punitive sanctions
against the instigators. Prior to 1928 any declaration of this nature would
have lacked jurisdiction to prescribe such a mandate. From 1928 to the
end of World War II no nation could have enforced its manifestation.
It was the combination of the two which finally gave the Allies juris-
diction.
There are two separate legal bases for the Charter's jurisdiction to
enforce: (1) as occupiers of Germany; (2) by including the crimes of
the Charter under the universality principle of jurisdiction. Both of these
became possible because the Allies were victorious.
The making of the charter was the exercise of the sovereign
legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich
unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these
countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recog-
nized by the civilized world ....
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law
it was to administer, and made regulations for the proper con-
duct of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what
12. A.L.I., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 6 (1962).
13. 46 Stat. 2343 (1929).
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any one of them might have done singly; for it is not to be
doubted that any nation has the right to set up special courts
to administer law.
14
By the Declaration of Berlin on June 5, 1945, the Allied Powers an-
nexed Germany "until such time as they thought fit to recognize an
independent German government."' 5 The Occupation forces were, as a
result, the legitimate government of the German state and, as such,
represented the sovereign power of Germany. As legitimate sovereigns
of Germany, the Allies displaced all of the municipal law of the Nazi
regime which was repugnant to the standards of law, justice and individ-
ual liberty.
It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted upon
by the United States, that whenever political jurisdiction and
legislative power over any territory are transferred from one
nation or sovereign to another, .. .all laws, ordinances, and
regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions
and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. 6
From the very beginning of its history this Court has recog-
nized and applied that law of war as including that part of the
law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the
status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well as of enemy
individuals.' 7
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption
of measures by the military command not only to repel and
defeat the enemy, but to seize and subject to disciplinary mea-
sures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede
our military effort have violated the law of war."'
In both their capacities as military conquerors and as the temporary
German government, the Allies, according to the holding of Ex parte
Quirin, could bring to justice all individuals who had violated the inter-
national customs of war.
According to the Lotus 9 case, a state can extend its criminal jurisdic-
14. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg) Judgement and Sentences (1946) as
reported in, 41 Am. J. INT'L L. 172, 216 (1947).
15. Wright, The Law of the Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 50 (1947).
16. Vilas v. City of Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 357 (1911); affirming Alverz y Sarchez v.
United States, 216 U.S. 167 (1910), and C., R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542
(1884).
17. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27 (1942).
18. Id. at 28.
19. The S. S. Lotus P.C.I.J., PUBLICATIONS, Ser. A, No. 10, 2 World Court Reports 20
(1927).
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tion to include any violation unless some rule of international law forbids
it. The charter adopted the universality principle of criminal jurisdiction
which had been extensively utilized previously for the crime of piracy.
Prior to 1945, some states had also adopted this doctrine for all offenses
which threatened their internal security.20 By applying the international
standard established in the Lotus case, the Charter was legally justified
in adopting the universality principle in order to establish criminal juris-
diction over the defendants.
THE TRIBUNAL'S PERSONALITY
The Charter which created the Tribunal was an executive agreement
entered into by President Truman in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces, and the other Allied Powers, as part of the
War effort. Traditionally the trial of war crimes has been placed in the
hands of military authorities. The Tribunal at Nuremberg, contrary to
this tradition, was composed of civilian jurists who were appointed by
their respective governments. Because of this some writers have rejected
the legality of the Tribunal.21 In answer to this objection, Major Willard
B. Cowles of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, Department of the
United States Army said, "A military Tribunal with mixed inter-allied
personnel may properly be established by the commanding general of
the cooperating cobelligerent forces," and, "In the United States, the
personnel of military commissions have usually been commissioned offi-
cers; there is, however, no legal objection to the use of qualified
civilians. 22
Another criticism of the Charter frequently raised is, that while labeled
"an international tribunal," it was in reality an interallied tribunal. Many
believe that these trials should have been postponed until such time as
the International Court of Justice was prepared to take jurisdiction.
Originally, the Charter was an interallied treaty creating obligations only
in the parties,23 and simultaneously endowing the entire community of
nations with the right of endorsement.24 It was a declaration by the
Allies for the entire international community to reaffirm the principles
of international law recorded in the Charter. The Charter was subse-
quently adopted and sanctioned by nineteen other nations 25 and on
20. Supra note 15, at 49.
21. Supra note 5.
22. Cowles, Trial of War Crimes by Military Tribunals, 30 A.B.A.J. 330, 331 (1944).
23. A.L.I., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTED
STATES § 142 (1962).
24. Ibid.
25. Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia, Greece, Australia, New Zealand, India, Ethiopia, Honduras, Panama, Haiti,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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December 11, 1946, by the United Nations in resolution No. 95(1)
which declared:
The General Assembly, recognizing the obligations laid upon it
by Article 13 ... Taking note of the Law of the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal of August 8, 1945, for the prosecution and
punishment of the major war.criminals; (1) reaffirms the prin-
ciples of the international law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal (of August 8, 1945), and the Judgment of
the Tribunal; (2) Directs the Assembly Committee on the Codi-
fication of International Law created by the Assembly's resolu-
tion.. . to treat as a matter of primary importance the formula-
tion of the principles of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and the Tribunal's Judgment in the context of a general codifi-
cation of offences against the peace and security of mankind or
in an International Criminal Code. 6
Through the endorsement of the Charter by the international community,
the Allies became the agent of all nations by ratification. As a result,
the Tribunal abandoned its interallied personality and acquired the legal
status of an international tribunal.
NUREMBERG'S LAW
Due to the lack of precedent, the law of the Charter and the Tribunal
needed explicit definition and elaborate justification.
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation,
initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in viola-
tion of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accom-
plishment of any of the foregoing; . . ."
Legally, this aspect of the Charter is considered by many to be the
most objectionable; for it not only declared aggressive war a crime, but
it also declared that it was one for which the Nazis could be punished.
The critics believe that it was, therefore, an ex post facto declaration
violating the principles of crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege
praevia. The issue is whether it was ex post facto law, and if it was, was
it illegal?
One source of international law is treaties. Prior to the outbreak of
World War II many nations of the world had bound themselves to
treaties for the purpose of eliminating war in the future. Germany and
the other Axis Powers are not excluded from this group. The Kellog-
26. Supra note 4, at 15.
27. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547 (Oct. 8, 1945).
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Briand Pact of 192828 was signed by all the Axis Powers. Its Preamble
states:
Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of
mankind; ... persuaded that the time has come when a frank
renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should
be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now
existing between their peoples should be perpetuated; . . .
convinced that all changes in their relations with one another
should be sought only by pacific means.., thus uniting civilized
nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an
instrument of their national policy; ...
In the text of the Treaty:
Article I: The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the
names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse
to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations
to one another.
Article II: The High Contracting Parties agree that the settle-
ment or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature
or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them,
shall never be sought except by pacific means.29
In the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Secretary of
State Stimson is quoted as having said in 1932:
War between nations was renounced by the signatories of
the Kellog-Briand Treaty. This means that it has become
throughout practically the entire world . . . an illegal thing.
Hereafter, when nations engage in armed conflict, either one or
both of them must be termed violators of this general treaty
law.... We denounce them as law breakers.3 0
Walter Lippman said "Unless this pact (Kellog-Briand) altered the
legal status of wars of aggression, it has no meaning at all and comes
close to being an act of deception."'"
Scelle stated: "La doctrine est g~nralement d'accord pour admettre
que le recours a la guerre d'aggression constitue un crime international."3 2
The Hague Convention of 1899"8 and 1907 and the Geneva Conven-
28. Supra note 13.
29. Ibid.
30. Judgement of the International Military Tribunal Against Major Nazi War Criminals
and Criminal Organizations, 20 T"mI'P. L.Q. 168, 212 (1947).
31. Lippmann, An Historic State Paper, 19 Trmp. L.Q. 157, 158 (1945).
32. SCELLE, PRfCIS DE DRoIT DES GENS, Deuxieme Partie, 47 (1934).
33. 32 Stat. 1803 (1902) ; 36 Stat. 2277 (1910).
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tion of 1927,4 entered prior to the Kellog-Briand Pact, recognized the
fact that the possibility of future war did exist and agreed to some
rules of conduct for that eventuality. This, however, in no way affects
the conclusion that aggressive war is a crime, but merely recognizes
that wars will occur.
In the League of Nations it was expressed:
The Assembly,
Recognizing the solidarity which unites the community of
nations; Being inspired by a firm desire for the maintenance of
general peace; Being convinced that a war of aggression can
never serve as a means of settling international disputes and is,
in consequence, an international crime .... 35
As a result of the Kellog-Briand Pact and the opinions of international
dignitaries and scholars, the jurisdiction to prescribe the law of Nurem-
berg was developed. Although aggressive war had not yet been trans-
muted into a crime, the period between the wars furnished a fertile field
for this occurrence. As a consequence of Kellog and the international
consensus which was derived from it, aggressive war came to be con-
sidered by custom an international crime.3 6
Custom of states is another of the long-recognized sources of inter-
national law. Many longstanding principles of international law were
developed out of customs recognized and adhered to by the community
of nations.
International law is more than a scholarly collection of abstract
and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties or
agreements between nations and of accepted customs. But every
custom has its origin in some single act, and every agreement
has to be initiated by the action of some state. Unless we are
prepared to abandon every principle of growth for International
Law, we cannot deny that our day has its right to institute cus-
toms and to conclude agreements that will themselves become
sources of a newer and strengthened International Law. Inter-
national Law is not capable of development by legislation, for
there is no continuously sitting international legislature. Inno-
vations and revisions in International Law are brought about by
the action of governments designed to meet a change in cir-
cumstances. It grows, as did the Common-law, through decisions
reached from time to time in adapting settled principles to new
situations.37
34. 47 Stat. 2021 (1932).
35. Records of the Eighth Ordinary Session of the Assembly, LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFI-
CIAL JOURNAL 155 (Special Supp. No. 54, 1927).
36. Supra note 3.
37. Report of June 7, 1945 from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the
[Vol. 4:146
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Out of the custom which originated in the Kellog-Briand Pact the
element of illegality was attached to the act of war. In order for it to
constitute a crime the element of punishment had to be suffixed to the
illegality of the act. By 1945 this was possible. The Charter was the
culmination of the law commenced in the Kellog-Briand Pact. It was a
declaration of what the law had germinated into since the termination
of World War I. The legal evolution had advanced to a state wherein
it was possible to fulfill the dreams of the signatories of the Kellog-
Briand Pact by 1945. Out of the war itself came the opportunity to
declare war a crime. Through the instrumentality of the ad hoc decision
at Nuremberg the seeds planted in 1928 sprouted into full blossom so
as to inform the entire community of nations that aggressive war is a
crime and was so since the Kellog-Briand Pact. The law of the Charter
did not become law in 1945, for it had been law since 1928. An analogous
circumstance occurs every time a common law court renders an ad hoc
decision that an act, which had heretofore not been prosecuted, was a
crime. Few would argue that this would be ex post facto." The Charter
did no more than this. 9
However, even if it is conceded that the law of the Charter was ex
post facto,
There is no rule of general customary international law forbid-
ding the enactment of norms with retroactive force so called
ex post facto laws. But . . . it is a principle of criminal law
recognized by most of the civilized nations that no punishment
must be attached to an act which was not legally punishable at
the moment of its performance. °
The doctrine of ex post facto is intended as a rule of justice to protect
against retroactive legislation. If, however, no injustice is in fact com-
mitted, there is no violation of the principle." It therefore becomes
necessary to determine if in fact an injustice has been perpetrated. On
numerous occasions during the war, both President Roosevelt and Prime
Minister Churchill had warned those on trial that they would be punished
for their acts. 2 On January 13, 1942, the governments of Belgium,
Czechoslovakia, Free France, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland and Yugoslavia declared that the instigators of the war
would be tried and punished as criminals for their acts.4 3 There is no
United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, reprinted in, 39 Am. J. INT'L L. 178,
187 (Supp. 1945).
38. Stimson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 179 (1947).
39. Supra note 3.
40. Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular
Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 530, 543 (1943).
41. Biddle, The Nurnberg Trial, 33 VA. L. REV. 679 (1947).
42. Supra note 4, at 3.
43. Ibid.
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doubt, therefore, that the defendants had received formal notice that
their activities were criminal prior to the enactment of the Charter. The
elements of adequate forewarning and certainty and the other basic re-
quirements of fairness and due process were thus present prior to the
declaration of the Charter." Justice demands no more than basic fairness
and due process. One can thus conclude that no rule of justice was vio-
lated by the Charter and even if the Charter was ex post facto it
violated no principle of international law when it declared aggressive
war to be an international crime.
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other pur-
pose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder
or ill treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, kill-
ing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity;",
The principle that the individual soldier who commits acts in
violation of the laws of war, when these acts are at the same
time offenses against the general criminal law, should be liable
to trial and punishment, not only by the courts of his own State,
but also by the Courts of the injured adversary in case he falls
into the hands of the authorities thereof, has long been main-
tained .... 46
On many occasions in the past, war crimes have been prosecuted.47
Several noted examples are the trial and execution of Henry Wirz for
the crime of killing Union prisoners of war during the American Civil
War,"8 and the imprisonment of a handful of German officers after the
First World War.49 For some time prior to the declaration in the Charter
the customs of war had been established. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to compare the established customs with the enumerated crimes
of the Charter, although they do correspond.
Another source of international law for the punishment of war crimes
can be found in the many treaties that were entered into prior to the
outbreak of hostilities in 1939. The most universally known of these are
the Hague Agreements of 1899 and 190750 and the Geneva Agreement
of 1927. 51
44. Snyder, It's Not Law-War Guilt Trials, 38 Ky. L.J. 81 (1949).
45. Supra note 27.
46. GARNER, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 72 (1920).
47. Supra note 17; and, In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
48. Op. cit. supra note 4, at 26.
49. Id. at 30.
50. Supra note 33.
51. Supra note 34.
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During the war, the United States Supreme Court52 held that a belliger-
ent state (The United States) could punish combatants for violations
of the customs of war as part of the law of nations. The Court based
its decision on the Customs of War and not on treaties. There was, there-
fore, little doubt that war crimes were properly indictable under inter-
national law.
(c) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder extermina-
tion, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against any civilian population, before or during the
war; or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated. 53
"After the beginning of the war ... these inhumane acts were held to
have been committed in execution of the war, and were therefore crimes
against humanity."54 In reality, therefore, the Tribunal did not enforce
this clause of the Charter, but instead incorporated Crimes Against
Humanity into Crimes Against War. Thus, there is no real international
legal problem as to this clause of the Charter.5 Those acts committed
prior to 1939 were not at issue.56 This did not deter the Tribunal because
most of the atrocities against humanity were committed during the war,
i.e., genocide, pillage, murder of prisoners, and other similar acts.
Responsibility
Article 6.
The Tribunal . . . shall have the power to try and punish
persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis coun-
tries, whether as individuals or as members of organizations.
Article 7
The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State
or responsible officials in Government Departments, shall not
be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating
punishment.
Article 8.
The fact the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Gov-
ernment or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility.
57
52. Supra note 17.
53. Supra note 27.
54. Supra note 41, at 694.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. Supra note 27.
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Generally, international law does not punish the individual criminal.
Rather, it imposes sanctions on the violating state and the individual
subjects of the state as a collective body. Thus, there is a collective
responsibility and not individual responsibility." There are, however,
some noted examples of crimes carrying individual responsibility. Some
of these crimes are piracy, breach of a blockade, carriage of contraband,
and illegitimate warfare. 9
One of the main obstructions for imposing individual responsibility
has been the act of state doctrine. Many eminent thinkers believe the
charter violated this doctrine. In its traditional formulation, the doctrine
precludes the court of one nation from inquiring into the validity of the
public acts of another sovereign power.6" This includes acts of individuals
committed under the authority of the sovereign state which are imputed
to the sovereign." The ultimate result of the application of the act of
state doctrine is the relinquishment of individual responsibility in lieu
of state or collective responsibility. In the field of international criminal
law, this precludes the utilization of judicially enforced punishment on
either the individual criminal or upon the nation to whom he has imputed
responsibility. Any international judicial sanction against a state by
another state would be contrary to the principles of sovereignty. 2
In The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon and Others,63 Justice Mar-
shall, speaking for the Court, held that the act of state doctrine exists
by virtue of an implied license of recognition of the acts of a state by
the other states in the community of nations. And, while not explicitly
stating it, he inferred that the doctrine has no application in wartime.
His understanding of the doctrine was that it existed by mere implica-
tion and, as a result, could be dissolved by a contrary expression by a
recognizing state. War, by its very nature, would destroy any implication
of consent and, as a result, the doctrine is not applicable during this
period. The reasonable inference derived from the act of war is the ab-
sence of any consensual relationship between the two nations involved.
For example, if states A and B are at war and C, the agent of A, con-
fiscates a private vessel from a national of state B, can it be reasonably
inferred that state B without a contrary declaration recognizes this as
a legitimate exercise of the sovereign power of state A? There is little
doubt that in peacetime the act of state doctrine would apply in such a
situation, but in times of war it is not only doubtful, and at most ideal-
58. Supra note 40, at 533.
59. Ibid.
60. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
61. Glueck, The Nuernberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARV. L. REV. 396 (1946).
62. Oetgen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250 (1897).
63. 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
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istic, to infer that state B would consent to the acts of the state to which
she was presently engaged with in armed conflict.
Many international authorities feel that the act of state doctrine has
no application to acts which violate international law. 4 The state, like a
corporation, is a fictitious entity, able to act only through its agents. It is
thus argued that the agents of a state's scope of authority extends only
to acts within international law and that acts outside the law are ultra
vires of the state and, therefore, the act of state doctrine has no applica-
tion. Courts can thus pierce the sovereign veil of the state and attach
individual responsibility to the agents of the state in the same manner
that agents of corporations are responsible.
The weight of the recent Sabbatino65 case is to the contrary of this
position. It can be argued, however, in criminal cases that there is a
presumption that "the sovereign" will not "avow himself an accomplice
or abettor of his subject's crime and draw upon his community the
calamities of foreign war."
6 6
[It] is an universal principle of jurisprudence that in cases
otherwise doubtful the rule of interpretation which gives the
most reasonable results to be applied; and the law of nations
is as much entitled to the benefit of that principle as any other
kind of law.6"
Using the reasonable interpretation and that which will lend a greater
hand to the work of justice, the dilemma of whether or not the act of
state doctrine applies to crimes against peace and crimes against war,
it must be concluded that it does not and that, in fact, it never has ap-
plied and that nonapplication of the doctrine was not an ex post facto
declaration.
Aside from the act of state doctrine, there still exists the issue of
whether or not the sanctions of international law are enforceable against
individuals as well as states. To a great degree the answer to this problem
is to be determined by the nature of the crime involved.6" One noted
example, as has been shown above, where international law is applicable
to the individual is the crime of piracy which utilizes the universality
principle of jurisdiction. The defendant indicted for that crime loses the
protection of his own state6" by his act because of the nature of the
64. Supra note 61; Biddle, supra note 41; 1 WHARTON, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 67. Contra, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 60.
65. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
66. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 68.
67. Pollock, The Sources oj International Law, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 511, 514 (1902).
68. Supra note 40.
69. OPPENHEI, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW § 272 (8th ed. 1962).
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crime which threatens the security of the open seas to all nations. The
same reasoning can be applied to the crimes of the Charter.
Ex parte Quirin has often been used by the advocates of the Charter
as evidence of individual responsibility for international war crimes.
The only difficulty with the utilization of this case as precedent is that
it is distinguishable from the situation which confronted the Nuremberg
Tribunal by the fact that in Quirin the defendants were indicted for a
municipal crime and not an international one. There are, however, some
noted examples where national courts have punished individuals for
international crimes."0 There appears to be little difficulty in applying
international law to individuals through the facility of incorporation of
international law into municipal law by the national courts. But whether
or not international law, standing on its own, can be enforced against
individuals is still an open question. Much of this controversy evolves on
the solidification of the role thatinternational law partakes in its relation-
ship to municipal law. At present there are many schools of thought on
this controversy, three of which are: (1) they are exclusive of each
other; (2) international law must be incorporated into municipal law;
(3) international law is superior to municipal law.
The adaptation of the third school of thought would facilitate a justi-
fication for the Charter. This, however, does not appear to be necessary.
Placement of individual responsibility for the crimes of the Charter can
be categorized with those crimes, like piracy, which threaten the security
of the community of nations. In fact, the crimes of the Charter pose a
greater threat than piracy. The perpetration of these crimes, therefore,
demands individual responsibility.
NUREMBERG'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
International law is still in the developmental stage. Out of necessity,
it must develop by meeting problems as they arise on an ad hoc basis;
otherwise, that which we call international law can never mature into a
system of law capable of keeping order in the community of nations.
There is no international legislature, nor is there, at present, a need for
one.71 In our ever-changing world, there would be little value in legislating
against future problems which may never materialize. On the other hand,
when the proper time and the proper case present themselves, inter-
national courts should approach the problem on an ad hoc basis.
A refusal to act for lack of established precedent under these circum-
stances would stagnate the development of international law and in due
course of time mythologize international law. Like all law, international
70. See, Republica v. DeLongchamps, 1 Dall. 111 (1784).
71. Stone, On the Vocation of the International Law Commission, 57 CoLum. L. REv.
16 (1957).
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law must meet the realities of its time in order to have any value to
man. In order to meet the realities of its time, it must continually
readjust its principles to meet the needs of society.
The Twentieth Century is confronted with a constant struggle between
the individual state's demand for sovereignty and the need for a world
community of nations. International law, to a great degree, is weakened
by the constant pressure of this struggle. It is the intermediary between
these two diverse realities; being the servant of two masters each of
whom is trying to be independent of the other but each of whom is
dependent on the other for its existence. This dilemma accentuates the
need for an international legal system which is capable of adjusting at
the proper time in order to meet the demands of both masters.
As international law has not yet reached maturity, it is too early for
it to deprive itself of a realistic existence by hard and unmaneuverable
principles of law. President Wilson, who was quoted by Justice Jackson,
said in 1919:
International law . . . has perhaps sometimes been a little too
much thought out in the closet. International law has-may I
say it without offense?-been handled too exclusively by law-
yers. If I were to add to his statement, I should say, It has
been handled-and not from any fault of their own-by a too
exclusive group of lawyers.
72
The problem is that in the past international law has been "bogged
down" with sophisticated legalistic principles which have outlived their
justification. As a result, international law has been slow in developing.
If it is to mature beyond its present state, it must be founded on the
principles of reason and justice so that it can satisfy the demands of the
realistic world in which it exists.
The law of Nuremberg is a realistic approach to international law
based on principles of reason and justice. The Charter was a unification
of the common and civil law traditions73 manifesting the legal position
of the community of nations. It denied the validity of certain outmoded
principles of law and created, in lieu of them, a new order of international
law furthering reason and justice.74 Under this new order of international
law, the brute realities of a situation can be faced by applying that law
which will attain the most effective solution for the sake of justice. The
effect of this new order will be a readjustment of international law so
that it can effectively cope with the problems of the Twentieth Century
and the ensuing centuries.
72. Jackson, The Rule of Law Among Nations, 19 TFnp. L.Q. 135, 137 (1945).
73. Jackson, Nuremberg in Retrospect, 35 A.B.A.J. 813 (1949).
74. Ehard, The Nuremberg Trial Against Major War Criminals and International Law,
43 Am. J. INT'L L. 223 (1949).
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At the dawn of the Twentieth Century, four immovable principles
obstructed the development of international law:" (1) state sovereignty
has no limitations; (2) all war is legal; (3) individual instigators of
war are immune from responsibilities by the act of state doctrine; (4)
obedience to orders is a defense to individual responsibility. Each of
these principles was either modified or invalidated by the Charter and
the Tribunal. Aggressive war is no longer a necessary evil. As a result
of the Charter and the Tribunal, it is an international crime for which
the individual authors are held responsible. The law of Nuremberg is
a denial of those principles of law which contradict the norms of reason
and justice, and the creation of a new order which is capable of con-
firmation and adjustment to those norms for all times.
F. Regan Nerone
75. Supra note 73.
